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TRESPASSING CHILDREN IN KENTUCKY-LIMITATIONS ON
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
The attractive nuisance doctrine, that exception to the general
lack of duty owing from land-owners to trespassers, which has been
created for the protection of the very young in order that the child
of the Industrial Age may find his world as safe a playground as did
his ancestors, has reached its broadest application in Kentucky in the
past fifty years and has begun to undergo a series of limitations.
The attractive nuisance doctrine has been defined by the Ken-
tucky Court as the doctrine that "one who maintains upon his premises
a condition, instrumentality, machine or other agency which is danger-
ous to children of tender years by reason of their inability to appre-
ciate the peril therein, and which may reasonably be expected to at-
tract children of tender years to premises, is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect them against the dangers of the attraction."i
While the court has shown no inclination to abandon the doctrine,
or to make any fundamental changes in it, there appears to be a
definite tendency on the part of Kentucky decisions to limit its applica-
hon.2 This has been effected by imposing various limitations upon the
duty of the owner of premises to the infant trespasser.
The Condition
One of these limitahons pertains to the condition itself - its in-
herently dangerous qualities and its attractiveness to children of tender
years. The court stated its policy quite frankly in a recent case: "The
tendency of courts is to restrict rather than to enlarge the attractive
nuisance doctrine and to exclude from its application things not
in their very nature dangerous or peculiarly alluring to children, such
as walls, fences, simple tools and appliances and conditions arising
from the ordinary conduct of business."-
One of the best examples of such conditions so excluded is the
standing railroad car upon which children often receive injuries. Re-
covery for such injuries has repeatedly been denied by the court,4 upon
the theory that no person in the exercise of reasonable care could or
'Latta v. Brooks, 293 Ky. 346, 348, 169 S.W 2d 7, 8 (1943).
Jarvis v. Howard, 310 Ky. 38, 219 S.W 2d 958 (1949); Ice Delivery Co.
v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230, 160 S.W 2d 605 (1942).
' Jarvis v. Howard, 310 Ky. 38, 42, 219 S.W 2d 958, 960 (1949).
'Durbin v. Louisville & N. Ry., 310 Ky. 144, 220 S.W 2d 1011 (1949); Tea-
garden v. Russell's Adm x, 306 Ky. 528, 207 S.W 2d 18 (1947); Jones v. Lous-
ville & N. By., 297 Ky. 197, 179 S.W 2d 874 (1944); Smith v. Hines, 212 Ky. 30,
278 S.W 142 (1925). See also, Barnhill's Admr v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co., 215
Fed. 608 (C.C.A. 1910).
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would be held to anticipate that a child would be attracted by a
standing railroad car,- and that is is not an instrumentality inherently
dangerous to children.6 In a 1910 case, a four year old boy, in at-
tempting to climb a telephone pole, caught his finger in an angle be-
tween the projecting prong and the guy wire thus tearing the finger
off. The court, in refusing recovery stated that no person in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care would anticipate that the structure was at-
tractive to children or dangerous to them.7 In 1915 the court found
that a wall forming one side of a viaduct maintained by a railroad com-
pany was not an attractive nuisance because even though children
found it attractive, it was not of an inherently dangerous nature.8
More recent decisions have applied this limitation to include an
unrailed ramp used for dumping coal from trucks to adjacent railroad
cars,' a wheelbarrow containing lime left in an unlocked garage,1O and
an ice truck left parked by the ice company s ice house."i
Evidence of the tendency to limit the application of the doctrine
is found by comparing these comparatively recent decisions with
earlier ones, such as a 1901 case, whch allowed recovery for injuries
to a nine year old boy received while playing on a railroad handcar,i1 2
and a case which gave recovery for a child's injuries received while
playing on lumber which had been irregularly stacked in defendant's
lumber yard.1 3
It should be noted that this limitation has not been imposed upon
a class of conditions which might be classified on the surface with those
of an apparently static and harmless nature, but which have a hidden
element of unperceivable danger. Perhaps the very best example to
be included in this class is the railroad turntable, from which the
doctrine derived its popular name of the "turntable doctrine." Ken-
'Jones v. Lousville & N. Ry., 297 Ky. 197, 179 S.W 2d 874 (1944). In
United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 2.58 U.S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299 (1922), the view
that the condition actually causing the injury must be the actual allurement to the
premises was followed. Two children died from injuries received in a pool con-
tamng sulfuric acid, but it was shown that they were not allured on the premises
by the pool, thus recovery was demed. Kentucky s view has not been clearly
decided.
'Smith v. Hines, Director General of Railroads, 212 Ky. 30, 278 S.W 142
(1925).
'Thompson v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 138 Kv. 109, 127S.W 5:31 (1910).Coon v. Ky. & Ind. Ry., 163 Ky. 222, 173 S.W 325 (1915).
'Jarvis v. Howard, 310 Ky. 38, 219 S.W 2d 958 (1949).
Latta v. Brooks, 293 Ky. 346, 169 S.W 2d 7 (1943).
Ice Delivery Co. v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230, 160 S.W 2d 605 (1943).
' Ililnois Central Railway Co. v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 684, 63 S.W 608
(1901).
'Bronson s Adm r v. Labrot, 81 Kv. 638 (1884).
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tucky courts have held that turntables are inherently dangerous and
attractive to children.14
A sand pile containing lime also furnishes an excellent example of
a non-mechanical object which may contain a hidden element of
danger and thus be brought within the doctrme,1r as does a tree
through which live electric wires are strung,16 and dynamite caps left
unguarded in a school building.1 7
Into which class the electric transmission tower falls has not been
so clearly decided. The court held that such a tower was not an at-
tractive nuisance in a 1935 case even when located near an athletic
field and used as an observation tower to view a football game.is (An-
other ground of this decision, however, was the age of the plaintiff -
sixteen years.) Seven years later recovery was allowed for the death
of a small boy who climbed such a tower, which was located near a
public pathway, on the theory that the evidence that the tower was
attractive and alluring to children and that the company was negli-
gent in not taking precautions to prevent children from climbing
thereon required submission to the jury under the attractive nuisance
doctrine.",
The question of water as an attractive nuisance was somewhat
settled in Kentucky in Von Almens Admr v Lowsville20 which held
that neither a small pond nor the wall partially surrounding it was an
attractive nuisance.
It is submitted that application of the attractive nuisance doctrine
in Kentucky has been limited to those objects and conditions which
are alluring to children of tender years and are inherently dangerous
either because of their mechanical nature or because of the existence
in them of elements of unperceivable danger.
Age of Plaintiff
Another limitation which has been imposed upon the attractive
nuisance doctrine by Kentucky decisions arises out of the application
of a rigid age standard. Consistently it has been held that the doctrine
" Louisville & N. By. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120, 166 S.W 2d 43 (1942); Brown
v. Chespakeake & 0. Ry., 135 Ky. 798, 123 S.W 298 (1909).
'Gnau v. Ackerman, 166 Ky. 2.58, 179 S.W 217 (1915).
" Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Garland, 314 Ky. 252, 234 S.W 2d 753 (1950).
17Jones Savage Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 233 Ky. 198, 2,5 S.W 2d 373
(1930).
" Denms Adm r v. Ky. & W Va. Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79 S.W 2d 377(1935).
" Deaton s Adm r v. Ky. & W Va. Power Co., 291 Ky. 304, 164 S.W 2d 468(1942).
180 Ky. 441, 202 S.W 880 (1918).
NoTEs
is applicable to persons under the age of fourteen years. Beyond that
age there is a presumption that the child is of sufficient intelligence to
appreciate the danger of his act and thus he becomes a trespasser
beyond the application of the doctrine.2  The court has repeatedly
stated that this presumption may be rebutted by sufficient evidence
establishing that the child is of such inferior intelligence as to be class-
ed with those for whom the protecting rule is created.2 2 However, one
case held that the presumption that a child of fifteen years is outside
the protected class is conclusive.2 3
The sort of evidence sufficient to bring the child of fourteen or
over into the protected class does not appear to have been settled.
A recent case held that a child may have had below normal school
grades and yet not be established as a member of the group to be
protected by the doctrine. "4 It may be assumed that the evidence must
be such as to discredit the child's general reasoning ability as to the
danger of the article to which he was attracted.
A 1927 case bases this prima facie presumption that a child of four-
teen years is aware of the consequences of trespass on the property of
another upon the following sections of the KENTUCKY REvISED STAT-
uT s: section 389.100 which restricts the employment of children under
fourteen years and has now been repealed, section 887.050 which
states that a fourteen-year-old minor may appoint his own guardian,
and section 402.020 which allows a female of fourteen to enter into a
valid marriage contract. ' 5 Although these statutes may create a pre-
sumption that a child of the age of fourteen has reached an age to be
capable of assuming such responsibilities, it seems a poor basis for
creating such a presumption as to trespass. Another basis for this
presumption which is often mentioned is an analogy to the presump-
tion that a child of fourteen has the same status as an adult in regard
to contributory negligence, as recogmzed by the Kentucky Court.26
This seems little more logical since this presumption too probably
received its foundation from these or similar statutes.
"' Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Earles Adnr, 311 Ky. 5, 222 S.W 2d 929 (1949);
Dennis Adm r v. Ky. & WVa. Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79 S.W 2d 377 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Hender s Guardian, 245 Ky. 328, 53 S.W 2d 694 (1932);
Louisville & N. Ry. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 2977, 295 S.W 175 (1927).
"'Louis Olle & N. Ry. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W 175 (1927). See also
Commonwealth v. Henderson s Guardian, 245 Ky. 328, 333, 53 S.W 2d 694
(1932).
' Columbus Mining Co. v. Napier s Adm r, 239 Ky. 642, 40 S.W 2d 285
(1931).
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Earles Adm r, 311 Ky. 5, 222 S.W 2d 929 (1949).
- Lousville & N. Ry. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W 175 (1927).
Dixon v. Stnnger, 277 Ky. 237, 126 S.W 2d 448 (1939).
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The Location
Another method of limiting application of the doctrine is the in-
sistence by the courts that the condition be located in a place where
children may reasonably be expected to trespass. The possessor of
land is not required to take precautions if he has no reason to believe
that children will come upon his premises..2 7 The court held in
Dominion Construction Co. v Williamson,2 8 that a mere allegation
that child was killed when he entered a train car to which he was
attracted stated no cause of action, there being no averment that the
owner knew or should have known that children played around the
train. The court said that this was not a repudiation of the attractive
nuisance doctrine, but merely a qualification.
Where the location is so removed from places where children
could likely be expected to be that the infant trespasser is compelled
to hunt for or seek it out, then the owner or maintainer of the premises
is not liable.2 9 An excellent example of a condition which may, in the
minds of reasonable men, be unaccessible to very young children, but
from which injury to them has occurred, is an electric wire strung
eighteen feet above the ground at the top of a telephone pole. A 1908
case denied recovery for the death of an eleven year old boy who
climbed such a pole and was electrocuted by the wire. The court said
that it could not reasonably be expected that a child would reach the
dangerous wire.3
0
In the case of Kentucky Utilities v Garland,31 1950, the court
allowed recovery for injuries to a small boy who climbed a tree in
which were hidden live electric wires. However, in holding the com-
pany liable, the court made careful note of the location of the tree
which was near children s homes on a path winch led to a stream
where they often played, and not on an isolated hill where children
could not be expected to be.
Necessary Precautions
In the definition of the doctrine laid down by the court, it is said
that one maintaining on his premises a condition which is dangerous
and attractive to young children must exercise reasonable care to pro-
PnossEn, TORTS, 621, citing Domimon Construction Company v. Williamson,
217 Ky. 62, 288 S.W 1018 (1926).
u217 Ky. 62, 288 S.W 1018 (1926).
'Puckett v. Lousville, 273 Ky. 349, 116 S.W 2d 627 (1938).
" Mayfield Water & Light Co. v. Webb s Adm r, 129 Ky. 395, 111 S.W 712
(1908).
"234 S.W 2d753 (Ky. 1950).
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tect them against dangers of such attraction.32 This does not mean
that the owner of the premises is an insurer against accident to tres-
passing children produced by the maintenance of the attractive
nuisance, but only that he must use the care of a reasonably prudent
man in avoiding such injury 33
If the utility of maintaining the condition which becomes an at-
tractive nuisance to the child of tender years greatly outweighs the
risk of injury to such children, it may be said that the owner generally
is not liable,34 unless he can by some comparatively inexpensive means
render the object less dangerous (as in the case of the railroad turn-
table which can be made harmless by the means of an inexpensive
lock or fastening), 3 5 or unless he has failed to make any reasonable
effort to warn children of the danger or prevent their playing thereon.36
However, there is no duty to maitain precautions which are impos-
sible or even greatly expensive. In McMillin s Adm r v Bourbon Stock
Yards Co.,37 two young children went into the defendant's stock yard
to play ball. One of them fell into the cattle dip and died soon there-
after from the effects of the poisonous water. Recovery was demed,
the court saying that the owner was under a duty to take reasonable
precautions for the safety of trespassing children, but he was not re-
quired to keep gates that are on his enclosed premises continually
locked, or to build his. fences so high that no person can climb over
them, or to have his servants continually on the lookout for trespassing
children.
A specific warning of the danger of the premises made to the child
is generally held to be insufficient care to absolve liability unless it
can be shown that the child was able to appreciate the warning and
proceeded at his own peril.38
Conclusion
Kentucky, in so carefully limiting its application of the attractive
nuisance doctrine, is in line with the general trend followed by the
majority of jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine. The ultimate
effect of this trend is that a middle-ground for the application of the
'Latta v. Brooks 293 Ky. 346, 169 S.W 2d 7 (1943). See also Jarvis v.
Howard, 310 Ky. 38, 41, 219 S.W 2d 958, 959 (1949).
'Puckett v. Lousville, 27.3 Ky. 349, 116 S.W 2d 627 (1938).
' Jarvis v. Howard, 310 Ky. 230, 219 S.W 2d 948 (1949).
' Brown v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. 135 Ky. 798, 123 S.W 298 (1909).
" McMillin s Adm r v. Bourbon Stock Yards Co., 179 Ky. 140, 200 S.W 328
(1918).
' 179 Ky. 140, 200 S.W 328 (1918).
'Cumberland River Co. v. Dicken, 279 Ky. 700, 131 S.W 2d 927 (1939).
See also Jones Savage Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 233 Ky. 198, 25 S.W 2d-373
(1930).
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doctrine has been reached, thereby making the doctrine more ac-
ceptable to all jurisdictions. Consequently, those dozen or so juris-
dictions, which formerly refused to accept the doctrine on the ground
that it was only a bit of sentimental humanitarianism, are willing, in
extreme cases, to find some excuse for liability.
3 9
NOR A D. BosTER
See PRossEn, TORTS, 618, 619.
